SIP-272: Atomic Swaps - Dynamic Fees

Author
StatusDraft
TypeGovernance
NetworkEthereum
ImplementorTBD
ReleaseTBD
Created2022-08-17

Simple Summary

This SIP proposes to incorporate dynamic fees into the atomic swap methodology.

Abstract

The dynamic fee model can be calibrated to fit the slippage function of any designated order book, hence higher fees would be levied as per the directional flow of the trade, resulting in more compensation to snx stakers when they take on larger positions. The calibrated dynamic model takes the following form:

$$ f(x) = u_{0} + u_{1} \sqrt{x} + u_{2} x + u_{3} x^2 $$

  • $x$ is the cumulative volume since the last trade reset block
  • $u_{0}$, $u_{1}$, $u_{2}$ and $u_{3}$ are calibrated off-chain for each synth

Important considerations:

  • All trades will have to route through sUSD under this function
  • The frequency by which cumulativeVolume resets is configurable via SCCP, denoted atomicKBlocks

Motivation

The Synthetix protocol spot trading product is an attempt at being a market maker that offers trading through the use of an oracle reading. This is different from the approach offered by most other AMMs, which in contrast use the composition of liquidity pools in order to gauge a price and subsequently incorporate slippage into the trade in order to compensate LPs.

The usage of oracle sources to execute a fill results in the Synthetix protocol being a constant target of latency arbitrage aimed at picking off advantageous pricing. To compensate, fees have been increased to a point at which the product itself failing at its mission of offering a venue for cheap spot trading. Though latency is as much of a problem for amm's as it is for Synthetix, the difference lies in AMM fees from small random trades which more make up for the capital losses incurred by price adjustments; as well as the slippage incorporated ensuring these lp price adjustments are efficient.

From Synthetix's perspective, attempts at this tackling this problem have sought to maintain a no slippage policy at the protocol level. The Fee reclamation mechanism tackles the latency issue but breaks composability and is unattractive due to the extreme uncertainty on price execution that it causes. The second iteration was the original atomic mechanism, which uses uni-v3 as an additional lively oracle source. Although uniswap is a very effective low-latency oracle source, it still suffers from the impact of a 1 block delay. This opens up a small gap for oracle front-running. Hence, this sips aims at addressing this issue while giving the protocol ability to fine tune slippage based on the volatility of the synth.

Proof Of Concept

In order to showcase the model's ability to replicate order books of any form this figure is used, where we show the slippage incurred when executing orders of different sizes in different markets:

  • The x axis represents the market order amount in dollar millions
  • The y axis is the slippage in bp for different order book and models of order books, calculated by computing the delta between best prevailing spot price and the average price expected from executing an order of a certain magnitude (shown in the x-axis).
  • The uni 5bp line is the slippage incurred when trading on the Uniswap 5 bp ETH/USDC pool
  • The cex is the slippage incurred from trading on the binance ETH/USDT orderbook.
  • The dashed lines, represent the modeled curves, fitted based on the uni-5bp and cex order books data.

The proposed model can replicate any order book to a certain degree of precision with the help of the least squares optimization algorithm, an implementation demonstrating this capability is available in this repository. It is important to mention that no slippage can be still configured into the trade, simply by setting the functional parameters (u0, u1, u2, u3) to zero.

The table below displays the slippage incurred when trading on the uniswap-5bp pool and on the binance ETH/USDT pool and the dynamic fees executed with the calibrated models that replicate those order books:

Trade cex cex_model uni uni_model
$25,000 0.00 3.82 0.00 0.26
$525,000 4.39 5.08 6.72 6.39
$1,025,000 8.14 8.05 13.44 13.14
$1,525,000 12.77 12.43 20.21 19.90
$2,025,000 17.63 16.92 27.03 26.69
$2,525,000 17.63 21.23 33.90 33.51
$3,025,000 24.68 25.21 40.81 40.36
$3,525,000 26.94 28.75 47.79 47.25
$4,025,000 26.94 31.82 54.85 54.19
$4,525,000 26.94 34.36 61.99 61.15
$5,000,000 26.94 36.26 68.83 67.81

It shows how slippage can be replicated with simple equations and tweaked in order to provide better execution by diluting the respective coefficients of the equation.

CEX Model

$$ 2 \frac{ F(x)} {x} = +1.00910^1 -2.37910^{-2} \sqrt{x} +2.29710^{-5}x -1.41810^{-12}x^2 $$

Uniswap Model

$$ 2 \frac{ F(x)} {x} = -8.50610^{-1} +4.88310^{-4} \sqrt{x} +1.30810^{-5}x +8.64210^{-14}x^2 $$

Specification

The specification includes three fundamental variable structures:

  • Cumulative Volume Structure
  • Best Execution Functional Parameters
  • Pricing Methodology

Cumulative Volume Structure

cumulativeVolume is a nested structure that takes the following form:

{currencyKey: 
  {'blockNumber': blockNumber,
   'cumulativeVolume':cumulativeVolume}}

Each time someone trades a synth, the first thing done is that the volume traded in sUSD is computed using the price obtained with the atomicPrice methodology denoted in SIP-158. The following logic is then applied on updating the structure:

  • In situations in which more than atomicKBlocks blocks have passed since the last time the structure is updated, then the cumulativeVolume is first reset to zero for that synth, before being updated with the latest volume being traded.
  • otherwise, the cumulativeVolume is updated cumulatively for the synth being traded into or out from. In case the direction of the trade is into a synth from sUSD the number incorporated into structure is a positive number, otherwise it's a negative number. Hence trades within the same atomicKBlocks blocks in different direction cancel out the the slippage applied.

A through example of this process is provided under the Test Cases.

Best Execution Functional Parameters

functionalParameters is a nested structure that takes the following form:

{currencyKey: 
  {'u0': u0,
   'u1': u1,
   'u2': u2,
   'u3': u3}}

The parameters of the best execution function are saved in a structure and configurable via SCCP.

Pricing Methodology

In order for fees to be quasi-agnostic to the distribution of trade flow (i.e. batched trades or single trades), the integral of f(x), F(x) would be used, given by the following expression:

$$ F(x) = u_0 x + \frac{2}{3} u_1 x ^ {3/2} + \frac{1}{2} u_2 x^2 + \frac{1}{3} u_3 x^3 $$

The dynamic fee function, that is imposed for a trade that pushes cumulativeVolume from x to y, is denoted by the function G(x,y) below:

$$ G(x,y) = |2 \frac{ F(y) - F(x)} {y - x}| $$

Few important considerations with G(x,y) model:

  • if a trade flows, denoted z, results in cumulative volume changing signs from a pre-trade cumulative volume of x, then dynamic fees are calculate with G(|z-x|,0)
  • dynamic fees are constrained between 0 and maxAtomicDynamicFee, configurable via SCCP

Hence the exchange would take place with the following computation, assuming that cumulativeVolume starts at zero:

  • if the sourceCurrencyKey is sUSD:

SrcAmount * 1/P * (1- baseFee) * [1-G(x,0)] => DestAmount

  • Otherwise:

SrcAmount * P * (1- baseFee) * [1-G(x,0)] => DestAmount

Technical Specification

Pending SC engineers input.

Test Cases

System Configurations:

  • kBlocks: 2
  • Current cumulative volume:
{'sETH':
        {'blockNumber': 10,
        'cumulativeVolume':0}}
  • Current f(x) parameters as configured here for mimicking uniswap-v3
  • atomic fees set to 0

Trade Examples:

  • At blockNumber 10, Swap 1m$ sUSD to sETH with atomic price at 1,600$ per ETH

    1. f(|1m$|) = -4.25e-1 + 3.66-4 * sqrt(1m$) + 1.31e-5 * (1m$) + 1.3e-13 * (1m$^2) = 13.15 bp
    2. blockNumber in cumulativeVolume structure doesn't need updating (since currentBlockNumber less blockNumber in structure is than kBlocks)
    3. cumulativeVolume updated to 1m$
    4. User receives 1m$ / 1600$ * (1-13.5bp) = 624.18 sETH

  • At blockNumber 11, Swap 624.18 sETH to sUSD with atomic price at 1,600$ per ETH

    1. volumeInUSD = 624.18 * 1600 = 998,685$
    2. blockNumber in cumulativeVolume structure doesn't need updating
    3. cumulativeVolume updated to 1m$ - 998,685$ = +1,315$
    4. f(|+1,315$|) = 0
    5. User receives 624.18 eth * 1600$ = 998,685 sUSD

  • At blockNumber 12, Swap 625 sETH to sUSD with atomic price at 1,600$ per ETH

    1. volumeInUSD = 625 * 1600 = 1m$
    2. blockNumber in cumulativeVolume is updated to 12 from 10 (since 12-10 = 2)
    3. cumulativeVolume is reset to zero, then it's updated to -1m$
    4. f(|-1m$|) = 13.15 bp
    5. User receives 625 * 1600 * (1-13.5bp) = 998,685 sUSD

  • At blockNumber 13, Swap 998,685$ sUSD back to sETH with atomic price at 1,600$ per ETH

    1. volumeInUSD = 998,685
    2. blockNumber in cumulativeVolume does not need an update
    3. cumulativeVolume is updated to 998,685$ - 1m$ = -1,315$
    4. f(|-1,315$|) = 0
    5. User receives 998,685$ / 1600 = 624.18 sETH

Configurable Values (Via SCCP)

  • $u_{0}$ , $u_{1}$ ,$u_{2}$ and $u_{3}$, can be configurable per synth, allowing the Spartan Council to fine-tune slippage based on the asset in mind.
  • atomicKBlocks would also be configurable per synth, specifying the number of block intervals at which slippage resets
  • maxAtomicDynamicFee

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

SIPs

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Synthetix Improvement Proposals (SIPs) describe standards for the Synthetix platform, including core protocol specifications, client APIs, and contract standards.